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ALICE IN WONDERLAND INTERPRETATIONS:
RETHINKING THE USE OF MENTAL MITIGATION EXPERTS
BY: DOUGLAS S. COLLICA
I. Introduction
Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1 (hereinafter "3:1") appears to
be a valuable tool to assist in developing and presenting evidence in
mitigation-and it can be. Recent interpretations of the statute by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, are so bizarre that they call for
attorneys to rethink the use of 3:1 and mental health experts granted
under that statute. Specifically, counsel may wish to give more serious
consideration to making full use of the expert provided under 3:1 short
of offering the expert's testimony. In any event, a record must be made
and issues preserved in the hope that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
erroneous rulings discussed below will someday be reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court. Further, the effective use of the statute
presents numerous trial and tactical choices that must be intelligently
made in each case. This article will introduce counsel to all of these
issues.
Il. The Statute and its Relation to Tactical Decisions
A. The Statute
1. Who?
Section 3:1 provides one or more court-appointed mental health
experts for indigent defendants charged with capital murder. 1 3:1 does
not require absolute indigency, only a showing that the defendant is
unable to pay for the experts. 3:1 does not limit defendants to one such
expert, and more than one expert may be appointed under the statute or
in conjunction with appointment under Ake v. Oklahoma.2 The statute
provides a broad mandate as to the role of appointed experts. 3 3:1 experts
are to be members of the defense team, not neutral evaluators. And while
the statute provides that the defendant is not entitled to the expert of his
choice, proper preparation can increase the likelihood of that result.
Defense counsel should have previously consulted with available ex-
perts, have particular candidates in mind, and make the availability and
suitability of these experts known to the court. The statute makes no
mention of, and does not envision, any involvement by the Common-
wealth in this matter.
I Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A).
2 470 U.S. 68 (1985). In Ake, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause requires that indigent defendants be provided the "raw materials"
and "basic tools" necessary to marshal their defense. Id. at 77 (citations
omitted). The Court further held that mental health experts are "basic
tools" and the right to such an expert attaches once an indigent defendant
shows that insanity will be a significant factor in his defense. Id. at 82-
83. Virginia has recognized that the holding of Ake, as clarified in
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (defendants have the right
to the "basic tools of an adequate defense") applies to other types of
experts. Husske v. Commonwealth, 1996 WL 517738 at *5 (Va. Sept. 13,
1996).
3 According to the statute, the defense expert appointed under 3:1
is "to assist the defense in the preparation and presentation of
information concerning the defendant's history, character, or mental
condition, including (i) whether the defendant acted under extreme
2. The Report
Mental health experts appointed under 3:1 are required, under
subsection (C), to submit a written report to defense counsel. This
"section (C) report" must contain the expert's opinion as to
(i) whether the defendant acted under extreme mental or
emotional disturbance at the time of the offense, (ii) whether
the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law was significantly impaired, and (iii) whether there are
any other factors in mitigation relating to the history or
character of the defendant or the defendant's mental condition
at the time of the offense 4
An important threshold decision concerns the content of this report.
It comes initially only to defense counsel and is protected by attorney-
client privilege. 5 As discussed below, however, the report may later
come into the hands of the Commonwealth's Attorney and aprosecution
expert.
Consequently, itis important that counsel maintain a good relation-
ship with the 3:1 expert. The expert may naturally be inclined to produce
a very lengthy report to demonstrate the thoroughness of the evaluation.
This, however, is not necessary. By the language of the statute, the
written report need only contain basic yes or no answers to the questions
posed in the statute and noted above. For example, in answering whether
there are other factors in mitigation, the answer given in the report may
simply be "there are." In fact, while defense counsel will want to have
very detailed verbal communications with the expert, it is probably a
good idea, at the outset, to stress to the expert the very minimal statutory
requirements of the written report.
6
3. Testimony by Defense Expert?
The tactical decisions made in addressing the above issues become
important because counsel must now decide whether to have the expert
testify in the event of a penalty trial, or to continue using the expert
without having the expert give testimony. The consequences of this
decision are discussed below.
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense; (ii) whether
the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly
impaired at the time of the offense; and (iii) whether there are any other
factors in mitigation relating to the history or character of the defendant
or the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense." Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 (A) (emphasis added).
4 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(C).
5 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(D).
6 It is also important that counsel first do their own complete
investigation, conceptualize a preliminary theory of mitigation, and
discus this theory with the expert before the expert conducts her evalu-
ation. See Konrad, Getting The Most And Giving The Least From
Virginia's "Mental Mitigation Expert" Statute, Capital Defense Digest,
vol. 3, no. 2, p. 22 (1991).
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The first consequence of deciding to have the 3:1 expert give
testimony is that the Commonwealth may obtain reciprocal examination
of the defendant. Once the defense intends to present testimony of an
expert witness to support a claim in mitigation, defense counsel must
notify the attorney for the Commonwealth. 7 The Commonwealth may
then seek an evaluation by its own mental health expert. If defense
counsel has given notice and the Commonwealth requests this reciprocal
evaluation, the court shall appoint one or more qualified experts to
perform such an evaluation. 8 The court shall then also order the defen-
dant to submit to such an evaluation, and advise the defendant that a
refusal to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert could result in
exclusion of the defendant's expert evidence.9
The text of 3:1 would appear to limit the scope of this reciprocal
examination to that "concerning the existence or absence of mitigating
circumstances relating to the defendant's mental condition at the time of
the offense." 10 It would not appear to be intended as an opportunity for
the Commonwealth to exhaustively search for evidence that might
support a claim of future dangerousness. 1' The Commonwealth's expert
is required to submit, to the attorney for the Commonwealth, a written
report containing the expert's findings and opinions. 12 However, 3:1
does not require the Commonwealth to provide the defendant with this
report or copies of any psychiatric, psychological, medical or other
records obtained during the evaluation. Nor does the statute require the
Commonwealth to give notice to the defendant of the intent to present
testimony of its mental health expert.
Another consequence of the decision to have the expert testify is the
requirement to turn over to the Commonwealth the section (C) report and
other reports.
As noted, the need to keep the written report as minimal as allowable
is due to the fact that the report can end up in the hands of the
Commonwealth's Attorney. After the defense has given notice of the
intent to present testimony of an expert witness to support a claim in
mitigation, defense counsel must then give the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney a copy of the section (C) report "and the results of any other
evaluation of the defendant's mental condition conducted relative to the
sentencing proceeding and copies of psychiatric, psychological, medical
or other records obtained during the course of such evaluation." 13 Note
that the statute does not specify how soon after giving notice the defense
must turn over its section (C) report and other reports. It is only fair that
defense counsel not give the Commonwealth copies of the reports until
after the Commonwealth has conducted its evaluation of the defendant.
The requirement that defendants who present testimony of a 3:1
expert give the Commonwealth a copy of the expert's report places these
7 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(E).
8 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1).
9 Id. Note, however, that as to the latter, the defendant must first be
advised, in open court, that his refusal to cooperate may be grounds for
the preclusion of the testimony of his own expert. The threatened
exclusion of the defendant's mental mitigation expert evidence raises
several constitutional issues which will not be addressed in this article.
For a discussion of these constitutional concerns see Bennett, Is Preclu-
sion Under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-2643:1 Unconstitutional?, Capital
Defense Digest, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 24 (1989). Notice of the intent to prevent
expert testimony is to be given 21 days prior to trial and the statute also
authorizes preclusion of defense evidence for failure to comply with this
provision. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(E).
10 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1). Compare Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.3:1 (A). See also note 3 (discussing the broader scope of the
defense expert's mandate).
defendants at a great disadvantage in comparison to defendants who are
able to hire their own experts or who obtain such expert assistance under
Ake. While defendants with retained experts or experts appointed under
Ake also must give notice to the Commonwealth of their intent to present
expert mitigation evidence, the requirement to turn over to the Common-
wealth the expert's report arguably does not apply because the disclosure
provision envisions only the report required by 3:1 and other records
obtained during the course of the 3:1 evaluation.
4. Limits on Commonwealth Reciprocal Expert
The statute contains an important limitation on the Commonwealth's
use of any evaluation performed by its mental health expert. The
Commonwealth may not introduce, at the sentencing phase, and for the
purpose of proving either vileness or future dangerousness, any of the
defendant's statements or disclosures or any evidence derived from such
statements or disclosures. According to the statute, "[s]uch statements or
disclosures shall be admissible only in rebuttal and only when relevant
to issues in mitigation raised by the defense." 14 These limitations,
however, are not self-executing. Defense counsel must be vigilant to
confine evidence and testimony of the Commonwealth's expert to
"rebuttal." "Rebuttal" in this sense should not mean, for example, that as
soon as the defense has introduced testimony that the defendant is
ordinarily a nice guy, the Commonwealth may then introduce expert
testimony, derived from the defendant's statements or disclosures, that
he will be dangerous in the future.
B. The Statute and its Relation to Constitutional
Requirements
1. The Defendant's Right to Have the "Basic Tools"
Necessary For His Defense
The Virginia statute was enacted in the aftermath of Ake v. Okla-
homa.15 The United States Supreme Court has held that Due Process
requires that indigent defendants be provided the "raw materials '16 and
"basic tools" necessary to marshal their defense.17 InAke, the Court held
that mental health experts are such "basic tools" in cases where sanity
will be a significant factor in the defense. 18 In capital cases, mental health
experts can be "basic tools" in the preparation and presentation of
mitigation evidence to be introduced at the penalty phase of the trial.
Appointment of a mental health expert under Ake requires a substantial
11 One of the two possible factors the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt to render the defendant eligible for the death
penalty is "that there is a probability based upon evidence of the prior
history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commis-
sion of the offense of which he is accused that [the defendant] would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C).
12 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1).
13 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(D).
14 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(G).
15 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
16 Id. at 77.
17 Id. (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).
18 Id. at 82-83. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
in Husske that the Ake holding applies to other types of experts. Supra,
n. 2.
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and detailed showing by the defendant. 19 Virginia's statutory entitle-
ments are less stringent. 3:1 mandates expert assistance to defendants
who must show only that they are charged with capital murder and are
unable to pay for such an expert.
2. What Does Defendant Say to Commonwealth's
Expert and How Can It Be Used?
Is the Commonwealth's reciprocal expert the equivalent of an
interrogating law enforcement officer? Does the defendant have a Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent and the right to advice of counsel at this
examination? Can these rights be waived? The answer to all of these
questions is "yes." Two questions arise, however What constitutes a
waiver of these rights? What are the consequences of failure to waive?
In Estelle v. Smith,20 the defendant was charged with capital murder
and the court ordered a psychiatric examination to determine his compe-
tency to stand trial. Defense counsel was not notified of the competency
evaluation. During the competency examination the defendant gave
statements to the psychiatrist. After conviction and during the penalty
trial, the State put the psychiatrist on the stand as an expert witness. He
testified that based on his evaluation of the defendant during the compe-
tency examination, he believed the defendant was a future danger.2 1
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment protection
against compelled self-incrimination applies at the penalty phase of
capital murder trials.22 Consequently, Miranda warnings must be given
to capital defendants before they are examined by mental health experts
for the State. If a capital defendant is not informed of his right to remain
silent and that anything he says to the expert can, and will, be used against
him, then the State may not present any testimony by that expert that rests
on the defendant's statements made during the examination.
23
United States Supreme Court precedent suggests that waiver and
submission to examination by the State's expert may be a prerequisite for
defendants who wish to put on expert testimony in support of a mental
state defense. In Estelle, the Court hinted that such a requirement might
be the only practicable way to put the defendant's expert mental mitiga-
tion evidence to sufficient adversarial testing. The Court noted that when
a defendant does introduce psychiatric evidence to support his defense,
his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means of contro-
verting his proof. Accordingly a defendant may be required to submit to
an examination by the State's mental health expert.24
19 While no court has explicitly formulated a checklist of what must
be included in an Ake motion, many courts require a showing as to the
following factors: (1) type of expert; (2) type of assistance; (3) name,
qualifications, and fees of the expert; (4) reasonableness of the cost; (5)
objective bases for the request; (6) subjective bases for the request; (7)
legal necessity; (8) legal entitlement to defense experts; (9) inadequacy
of available state experts; and (10) supporting information for all of these
factors. Konrad, supra note 6, at 22 (citing Monahan, Obtaining Funds
For Experts In Indigent Cases, Champion, August, 1989). It should be
noted, however, that because the detailed showing required under Ake
cannot be made without revealing defense theories and other privileged
or otherwise undiscoverable material, defense counsel should be permit-
ted to make the showing ex parte. A brief and memorandum of law in
support of the right to proceed ex parte is available from the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse.
20 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
21 Id. at 456-457, 459-60.
22 Id. at 463.
23 Id. at 468-69.
24 Id. at 472.
25 483 U.S. 402 (1987).
The Supreme Court made this clear in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 25
which involved defense expert evidence in support of the defense of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, which could be sufficient to
reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter.26 The Court held that
a defendant who has interjected the issue of a mental defense has waived,
at least in part, his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
At the very least, the State may rebut the defendant's mental defense
evidence with evidence from the reports of the examination with the
defendant's own expert. Furthermore, such defendants may be com-
pelled to submit to a reciprocal examination by the State's mental health
expert.27
The United States Supreme Court has not held, however, that
waiving Fifth Amendment protection is a prerequisite to putting on
expert testimony in mitigation at a capital penalty trial. In fact, the Court
has not looked kindly on any procedural barriers to the presentation of
mitigation evidence.28
Thus, notwithstanding the preclusion sanctions authorized in 3:1
and the likely requirement that Fifth Amendment rights are waived as a
condition precedent to presentation of a mental state defense such as
insanity or extreme mental or emotional disturbance, it is by no means
settled law that capital defendants must, or do, waive their rights relative
to their penalty trial evidence.
3. The Right to Notice and the Role of Defense Counsel
Regarding the Commonwealth's Reciprocal
Examination
In addition to the Fifth Amendment protections discussed above,
once formal charges have been brought against a defendant, the defen-
dant has full blown Sixth Amendment rights. The Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel requires effective assistance of counsel,
which, in turn, requires that capital defense counsel be notified, in
advance, that the defendant is to be examined by a mental health expert
for the State, and that the examination will encompass the issue of future
dangerousness. The defendant must have "the assistance of [counsel] in
making the significant decision of whether to submit to the examination
and to what end the [State expert's] findings could be employed." 29 In
Powell v. Texas30 and Satterwhite v. Texas,31 the Supreme Court spoke
again on the implications of the Sixth Amendment to capital defendants
ordered to submit to State mental health expert examinations. The Court
26 Id. at 423.
27 Id. at 422-24.
2 8 SeeLockettv. Ohio,438 U.S. 586 (1978) (requiring deathpenalty
schemes to allow consideration as mitigating factor any aspect of
defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense that
defendant proffers as basis for sentence less than death); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (finding constitutional error in sentenc-
ing court's conclusion that it could not consider defendant's troubled
family history as mitigating factor); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367
(1988) (holding unconstitutional death penalty sentencing instructions
which reasonable juror could interpret as requiring unanimous jury
finding on presence of mitigating factors); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989) (finding error where trial court's instructions did not allow
jury to consider, as mitigating factors, evidence of defendant's mental
retardation and childhood abuse); and McKoy v. North Carolina, 494
U.S. 433 (1990) (striking down statute that precluded consideration of
mitigating factor unless all jurors found it to be present).
29 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 471.
30 492 U.S. 680 (1989).
31 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
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held that defense counsel must be given clear notice of the purpose and
scope of the examination.
32
InEstelle, the Commonwealth's expert had examined the defendant
and submitted a report to the court in which the expert termed the
defendant "a very severe sociopath."'33 Even though defense counsel
were aware that the expert's report had been submitted and was located
in the trial court's file of the case, the Court held that there had not been
clear notice because counsel were not notified in advance that the
examination would encompass the issue of the defendant's future dan-
gerousness.
34
The Court re-emphasized the notice requirement in Powell and
Satterwhite. In Powell, the Court stated that it recognized that the notice
required by the Sixth Amendment was a separate and distinct question
from that of the waiver of Fifth Amendment privileges. The Court
explained that in Buchanan it had addressed the separate Sixth Amend-
ment issue and concluded that "on the facts of that case, counsel knew
what the scope of the examination would be before it took place. '35 The
Powell Court then held that where defense counsel did not know that the
Commonwealth's examination would involve the specific issue of future
dangerousness, the notice was insufficient under the Sixth Amend-
ment.36 In Satterwhite, the trial judge granted the State's motion to
examine the defendant to determine, among other things, the defendant's
future dangerousness. The expert reported to the court in a letter that in
his opinion the defendant had a severe antisocial personality disorder,
was extremely dangerous, and would commit future acts of violence. 37
The State's motion, the court's order, and the expert's letter were in the
trial court's file of the case. Even so, the Court held that such constructive
notice to defense counsel did not satisfy the clear notice requirement of
the Sixth Amendment.
38
Application of these rules to Virginia's death penalty scheme would
certainly not suggest that the "clear notice of purpose and scope"
requirement is satisfied by the Commonwealth's request for reciprocal
examination. As mentioned, the language of the statute itself would seem
to forbid evaluating for future dangerousness at all.
39
Once the question of sufficient notice is settled, unanswered issues
remain regarding the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The
defendant's Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Estelle entities him
to advice on whetherand how to communicate with the Commonwealth's
expert. It is likely that the full Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which
emerges after formal charging, must encompass more. Similar to the
post-indictment right to be present at lineups, 0 for example, it is
32 Powell, 492 U.S. at 685; Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 255-256.
33 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 459.
34 Id. at 470-71.
35 Powell, 492 U.S. at 685.
36 Id.
37 Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 253.
38 Id. at 255.
39 In Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 243-47,427 S.E.2d
394, 407-08 (1993), the Supreme Court of Virginia appeared to hold
otherwise, saying that 3:1 permits the Commonwealth's expert to evalu-
ate future dangerousness as well.
40 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that post-
indictment lineup was critical stage of prosecution at which defendant
was as much entitled to aid of counsel as at trial itself; thus both defendant
and counsel should havebeen notified ofimpending lineup, and counsel's
presence should have been requisite to conduct of lineup, in absence of
intelligent waiver). See also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972)
arguable that defense counsel have the right to be present at the
Commonwealth's evaluation.
III. Off With Their Heads! The Fourth Circuit Interprets 3:1
A. The Distinction Between "Defense" and "Mitigation"
The Supreme Court of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals have resolved the waiver issue against capital defendants in a
way that ignores the important distinction between fairness to the
Commonwealth when the defendant is asserting a defense, and the
presentation of mitigation evidence. Nevertheless, under Estelle and
Buchanan these are questions about which reasonable jurists could
differ.
On the question of notice to counsel, the scope of the
Commonwealth's examination, and permissible limits to the
Commonwealth's expert's testimony, however, recent holdings of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals are so bizarre as to require a complete
rethinking of the use of 3:1 experts.
Against the constitutional backdrop outlined above, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided Payne v. Netherland41 and
Savino v. Murray.
42
The court, without recognizing or discussing the important distinc-
tion between mental state defenses and capital mitigation evidence,
relied on Estelle and Buchanan to find that waiver of Fifth Amendment
rights was required and had occurred.43 As noted, this is a question also
left unsettled by the United States Supreme Court, but is one about which
reasonable persons could differ.44
The court's holdings with respect to the notice requirement and
other aspects of the plain language of 3:1, however, were so bizarre as to
require a complete rethinking by defense counsel of how best to use the
resource provided by the statute.
Payne was a case in which, prior to the enactment of 3:1, defense
counsel requested an evaluation of the client to determine his compe-
tency to stand trial. Somehow, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided that this provided the "purpose and scope" notice that the
Commonwealth's expert would examine the defendant on and testify to
future dangerousness, as constitutionally required by Estelle, Powell and
Satterwhite. In Payne, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Commonwealth could introduce against the defendant, for the purpose of
proving future dangerousness during its case in chief at the penalty trial,
(holding that police station showup after arrest but before indictment or
other formal charges was not "criminal prosecution" at which petitioner
had constitutional right to be represented by counsel.
41 1996 WL 467642 (4th Cir. (Va.) Aug. 19, 1996) (unpublished
table opinion). See also case summary of Payne, Capital Defense
Journal, this issue.
42 82 F.3d 593 (4th Cir. 1996). See also case summary of Savino,
Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
43 Payne, 1996 WL 467642 at *5; Savino, 82 F.3d at 604.
44 The court was considerably less clear about what constitutes a
waiver and when it occurred. In Savino, the court stated that "[i]n
essence, the defendant waives his right to remain silent.., by indicating
that he intends to introduce psychiatric testimony." 82 F.3d at 604.
However, in Payne the court held that under the reasoning of Savino
waiver occurred when "[the defendant] introduced the psychiatric
evidence relating to his future dangerousness." 1996 WL 467642 at *5
(emphasis added).
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testimony by the Commonwealth's psychologist who had conducted the
competency evaluation. The expert testified that it was his opinion that
the defendant constituted a continuing serious threat to society. The
expert also testified that his opinion was based on the defendant's past
criminal history, other scrapes with the law, and the circumstances of the
present crime.45
A competency evaluation is neither an effort to establish a "mental
state defense," nor even "mental mitigation." It is a question on which the
law requires all parties to have an interest.46 A competency evaluation
provides no adversarial advantage to anyone and it is inconceivable that
the court could find a request.for such an evaluation to equal notice that
it would produce future dangerousness testimony. Certainly, the Estelle
line of cases does not give clear notice that a competency evaluation will
encompass the issue of the defendant's future dangerousness. Neither
does 3:1 give such notice.
In addition to reinforcing its suspect interpretations concerning
notice and waiver,47 the court, in Savino, showed how permissive it
would be toward the Commonwealths expert, even when future danger-
ousness testimony is given first, during the Commonwealth's case in
chief, rather than in rebuttal. In Savino, the prosecution's expert testified,
during the Commonwealth's case in chief at the penalty trial, that it was
his opinion that there was a "high probability that Savino would be a
future danger to society. ' 4 8 The expert also testified that his opinion was
not based on statements made by Savino, but was instead formulated on
the basis of three independent factors: Savino's previous criminal
history, thenature of thecrime, and Savino's history of drug abuse. 49 The
court credited this account in spite of the fact that it was revealed that the
report prepared by the Commonwealth's expert contained references to
statements made by Savino during the evaluation.50 Rather than viewing
this as casting doubt on the expert's credibility, the court seemed more
concerned that it was revealed during cross-examination of the defense
expert. 51 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 3:1 differentiates
between a defendant's statements, and an expert's opinion based upon
such statements. The court held that neither 3:1 nor the Constitution
precluded the introduction of the opinion testimony of the
Commonwealth's expert.
52
If mere assertion of non-reliance on statements or evidence derived
therefrom is to be so casually accepted, it is another indication that the
best course of action may be to insulate the client altogether from
examination by prosecution experts.53
4 5 Id. at *2.
46 The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly and consis-
tently recognized that 'the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant
violates due process."' Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1376
(quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992); Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-172, (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375,378 (1966)). The Court has also stated that"the significance of this
right [is not] open to dispute . . . . Competence to stand trial is
rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed
essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of
counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine wit-
nesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent
without penalty for doing so." Id. at 1376-77 (quoting Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162,171-72 (1975); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-140
(1992) (concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy)). The Court has held
that "the right not to stand trial while incompetent is sufficiently
important to merit protection even if the defendant has failed to make a
timely request for a competency determination." Id. at 1377 n.4 (cita-
IV. Conclusion
Unless and until the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari
to review the interpretations contained in Savino and Payne in light of its
established constitutional requirements, the two cases call for rethinking
several aspects of the use of 3:1.
First, it calls for rethinking the choice of whether it is essential that
the expert actually testify. Counsel can still make very effective use of the
mental mitigation expert without subjecting the defendant to examina-
tion by an expert for the Commonwealth. The expert can be of tremen-
dous assistance in helping defense counsel to investigate and interpret the
significance of the family history and other life experiences of the
defendant. The expert can also help to formulate the theory of mitigation
and assist in the preparation for presenting the mitigation story. How-
ever, the expert does not have to be the one to relate that story to the jury.
Lay witnesses, such as family members and friends, school teachers, and
correctional facility employees may be able to tell the mitigation story,
and do so in a more convincing fashion. In addition, if defense counsel
encounters testimony of a mental health expert for the Commonwealth
who has not interviewed the defendant but will testify to the defendant's
future dangerousness, the defense's mental health expert could be an
invaluable resource in assisting defense counsel in preparation for cross-
examination of the Commonwealth's expert.
Second, if defense expert testimony is deemed essential, make
intelligent tactical choices concerning disclosure of reports, how the
client will deal with the Commonwealth's expert, assertion of Sixth
Amendment counsel function such as presence at the Commonwealth's
evaluation, and confining the Commonwealth's evidence to rebuttal.
Third, make an appellate record on Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds ensuring that the record reflects, at a minimum,
objections to (a) insufficient notice, and (b) any barriers to full presen-
tation of the defense's case in mitigation.
Joseph Savino is dead. Joe Payne's death sentence was commuted
at the last moment. The present import of the use and misuse of expert
testimony by the Commonwealth will remain unknown. These cases
serve as a warning to the defense community, however, that every effort
must be made to enforce the strictures of the law forbidding the casual
and unchallenged use of questionable evidence designed to play upon the
fears of jurors.
tions omitted).
47 In Savino, the Fourth Circuit held that 3:1, both on its face and
by its operation, provides defense counsel with adequate notice that the
defendant waives his Fifth Amendment rights by requesting apsychiatric
evaluation pursuant to the statute. 82 F.3d at 604.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 605.
50 Id.
51 Savino, at 82 F.3d 605.
52 Id. at 603, 605.
53 Even this may not guarantee that the defense will not face expert
testimony on future dangerousness from prosecution experts who have
notinterviewed the defendant atall. That is what theprosecution's expert
in Texas, Dr. Grigson, turned to afterEstelle. At least, however, the task
of undermining the credibility of such testimony should be easier,
especially with the assistance of a non-testifying defense expert.

